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ABSTRACT
The School of Graduate Studies
The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Degree ________Master of Arts______ College/Dept. ____Liberal Arts/Psychology____
Name of Candidate ___________________ Brandi A. Cook___ ____________________
Title The Effect of Misleading Identification on Juror Decision-Making______________
The goal of this study was to determine how varying witness information influenced jury
verdicts for an individual identified in a photographic lineup. Participant-jurors (N =
145) read a criminal case and eyewitness testimony transcript before choosing a guilty or
not guilty verdict for a selected individual. The witness’s quality of view, familiarity
with the perpetrator, and neighbors’ input (hearsay) were manipulated. Identifications
based on a facial view generated the same guilty rate as an identification based on culprit
clothing or neighbor input. A witness with a very poor view received significantly less
guilty verdicts. Verdict confidence did not differ significantly between conditions.
Results suggest a lack of juror discriminability and potential bias to convict.
Keywords: Jury decision-making, eyewitness testimony
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A recent report by the Innocence Project reveals that eyewitness misidentification
has played a role in over 70% of wrongful convictions later cleared by DNA evidence
(Innocenceproject.org, 2016). To date, more than 300 innocent people have served an
average of 14 years in prison for crimes they did not commit. When considering cases in
which DNA evidence was unavailable for testing, the actual number of mistaken
convictions is surely higher. This is particularly troubling because wrongful
imprisonment not only forces injustice on an innocent person, but also absolves the true
perpetrator of any responsibility for the crime. Jury members still place a large degree of
emphasis on witness testimony even though faulty witnesses account for a staggering
number of these false convictions (Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979; Wise, Sartori,
Magnussen, & Safer, 2014).
One particular case that exemplifies how witness testimony can persuade and
mislead jurors involves the story of Darryl Hunt. In 1985, 19-year-old Darryl Hunt was
wrongfully arrested, charged, and convicted of sexually assaulting and murdering a
young woman in his hometown of Winston-Salem, North Carolina. During the
investigation, a witness came forward claiming to have seen an African American man
with the victim on the morning of the crime. Police then arranged a photographic lineup
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based on the witness’s description. When presented with this lineup, the witness
identified Hunt as the man he had seen previously with the victim. Other witnesses for
the prosecution came forward to testify that they had seen Hunt with the victim and that
he had left bloody towels in a nearby hotel restroom. With this mounting eyewitness
evidence, a jury convicted Hunt of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. Nineteen
years later, Hunt was exonerated through DNA evidence and the real perpetrator was
found.
Determining Witness Accuracy
Hunt’s case illustrates the importance of eyewitness testimony and its
persuasiveness to jury members. In fact, jurors often equate the probative value of
witness testimony to that of physical evidence, such as DNA or fingerprints (Boyce,
Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007; Skolnick & Shaw, 2001). Understanding how jurors evaluate
witness reports may provide valuable insight into wrongful convictions, particularly those
that rely primarily on witness identification. Research indicates that many serious crimes
lack forensic evidence (Peterson, Hickman, Strom, & Johnson, 2013; Peterson, Sommers,
Baskin, & Johnson, 2010). This necessitates the need for jurors to evaluate defendants in
some cases based on witness testimony alone (Wogalter, Malpass, & Mcquiston, 2004).
In order to avoid the conviction of an innocent person, a jury must determine whether or
not a witness made a correct identification. Unfortunately, studies show that jurors are
often unable to differentiate accurate from inaccurate witnesses (Beaudry et al., 2015;
Boyce et al., 2007; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells et al., 1979; Wells, Lindsay,
& Tousignant, 1980). This lack of discriminatory ability could potentially account for
the unacceptably high rate of wrongful convictions that result from mistaken witnesses.
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Laboratory research provides consistent support for jurors’ inability to determine
witness accuracy. Wells et al. (1979) demonstrated that nearly 80% of participant-jurors
believed the testimony of incorrect witnesses. In this study, participant-witnesses first
observed a confederate commit a mock crime before making a lineup identification of the
culprit. Lineup choosers answered cross-examination questions and provided confidence
ratings for their identifications. Next, another group of participant-jurors viewed the
cross-examinations and determined whether or not the witnesses were accurate in their
testimony. Results revealed that jurors could not predictably judge the accuracy of
witnesses.
This pattern occurred even when the quality of crime conditions were
manipulated. A study by Lindsay et al. (1981) provided participant-jurors with one of
three witness testimonies intended to yield either 33%, 50%, or 74% accurate
identifications. In the poor view condition (33% accuracy), the culprit wore a hat low on
the head and was only visible for a brief duration of time. In the moderate view condition
(50% accuracy), the culprit wore the hat higher on the head to expose more of his face.
Finally, in the good view condition (74% accuracy), the culprit wore no hat and was
visible for a longer period of time. As in the Wells et al. (1979) study, participantwitnesses viewed these mock crimes, were presented with photographic lineups, and
underwent cross-examination by an experimenter if they made an identification.
Participant-jurors then evaluated the cross-examinations to determine whether or not the
testimonies were accurate. Results indicated that although participants appropriately
reduced their rate of belief across situational-accuracy conditions, they were still no more
likely to distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses within any one condition. In
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other words, participants recognized that the different viewing conditions could yield
varying degrees of accuracy, but they were still unable to determine which witnesses in
each condition were accurate. These findings still endure in more modern examples of
scientific research.
Contemporary research illustrates how juror discriminability has not significantly
improved in the last several decades. Beaudry et al. (2015) examined how jurors
evaluated eyewitness evidence by presenting participant-jurors with video-taped
testimonies of witnesses to a mock crime. In this study, a confederate acting as a lawyer
interviewed these witnesses about details relevant to the crime, such as lighting
conditions, exposure duration, memory for the event, level of attention, and identification
confidence. Although they were presented with these important eyewitness factors,
participant-jurors’ belief in the witnesses’ accuracy reflected only chance performance.
This further suggests that jurors lack adequate knowledge about how viewing conditions
can influence identification accuracy.
Unfortunately, providing jurors with advice from eyewitness experts did not
sufficiently improve witness discriminability. To examine how expert testimony
influences juror belief rate, Wells et al. (1980) employed the same witnessing conditions
as Lindsay et al. (1981); in this instance, however, researchers manipulated whether or
not participant-jurors received information about potential witness issues. One group of
jurors was instructed that poor viewing conditions could increase the probability of
witness error and that witness confidence statements may not reflect accuracy. The other
group received no expert advice. The jurors then evaluated witness statements and
determined whether or not the testimonies were accurate. Results demonstrated that
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providing expert advice did not improve jurors’ ability to discriminate between accurate
and inaccurate testimonies. Furthermore, expert advice did not increase sensitivity to the
influence of varying witnessing conditions; participant-jurors were just as likely to
believe accurate as inaccurate witnesses in all viewing conditions, even when the view of
the culprit was very poor. This phenomenon has also been observed across a vast array
of experimental paradigms.
Further exploring jury decision-making research demonstrates little evidence to
support the effectiveness of expert evidence on juror discriminability. Martire and Kemp
(2011) evaluated 24 experiments that incorporated a wide range of different measures to
determine the various potential impacts of expert testimony. These measures included
jurors’ assessments of eyewitness reliability, credibility, and scrutiny as well as verdict
confidence. Across all of these studies, there was negligible support for the idea that
providing expert advice can reliably improve jurors’ ability to differentiate accurate from
inaccurate witnesses. It appears that although jurors seem to value and welcome
guidance from eyewitness experts (Blackwell & Seymour, 2015), this assistance does not
reliably aid in determining witness accuracy. If guidance from experts does not impact
discriminability, then jurors must evaluate other criteria; unfortunately, the current
standards may also not improve judgments of accuracy (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009).
These findings raise concerns about the jury decision-making process and support the
need to improve current jury guidelines.
Current Jury Guidelines
In 1972, the Neil v. Biggers case prompted officials to organize a set of standards
to guide jurors’ evaluations of eyewitness testimony. The resulting Biggers criteria seek
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to enhance judgments of accuracy by educating the jury on key factors that could impact
witness identifications. The five guidelines include the witness’s degree of confidence
(certainty), the quality of viewing conditions (view), the amount of attention given to the
perpetrator (attention), the degree of match between the perpetrator’s description and the
defendant’s appearance (description), and the time between the crime and culprit
identification (time). Although these guidelines are still in use today, Wells and
Quinlivan (2009) contend that adherence to the Biggers criteria may actually lead to
significant errors in judgment. If jurors rely on flawed decision-making criteria, this
could explain the alarmingly high rate of wrongful convictions that result from mistaken
witnesses.
One of the ways in which the Biggers guidelines may mislead jurors involves the
criterion of witness certainty (Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Cling,
2012; Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). The standard of “certainty” refers to a positive
relationship between witness confidence and identification accuracy; i.e. highly confident
witnesses are more likely to be accurate. This guideline instructs jurors to consider
witness confidence when evaluating testimony accuracy. Unfortunately, research shows
that relying on witness certainty does not necessarily improve jurors’ ability to
distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses (Lindsay et al., 1981; Penrod & Cutler,
1995; Wells et al., 1979; Wells et al., 1980). Results of these studies demonstrated that
although perceptions of witness confidence strongly influenced jurors’ belief, the actual
relationship between confidence and accuracy was either weak or nonexistent in
comparison. In fact, the only occasion in which a positive correlation between witness
confidence and accuracy existed involved obtaining the witness’s identification and
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confidence statement immediately following the crime (Beaudry et al., 2015). Still,
between the time of the witness’s identification and the courtroom testimony, confidence
tended to inflate in such a way that it no longer correlated with accuracy (Douglass &
Jones, 2013). This indicates that the Biggers’ certainty criterion may not provide enough
discriminatory value to protect against inaccurate testimony.
If witness certainty does not reliably communicate accuracy, then jurors must use
other measures to filter inaccurate witnesses, such as evaluating whether the witness had
the opportunity to view the perpetrator’s face and under what viewing conditions the
crime occurred. Poor viewing conditions during a crime may greatly impede witnesses’
subsequent identification of a suspect’s face (Adini, Moses, & Ullman, 1997; Memon,
Hope, & Bull, 2003; Tarr, Georghiades, & Jackson, 2008); even so, jurors often appear
unaware of the extent to which these conditions negatively influence witnesses’ memory.
In an experiment by Lindsay, Lim, Marando, and Cully (1986), mock jurors were
presented with testimonies of eyewitnesses who experienced varying qualities of viewing
conditions, exposure times, and distances from the perpetrator during the events of the
crime. Results indicated that lighting conditions and time of day did not significantly
influence jurors’ decisions concerning the perceived accuracy of the witness;
furthermore, exposure duration and proximity to the perpetrator also did not meaningfully
alter jurors’ conviction rate. Contemporary research provides additional support for
jurors’ lack of discriminability in regards to witness view.
A modern inquiry into perceptions of witness testimony further illustrate jurors’
focus on factors unrelated to accuracy. Sharps, Herrera, and Price-Sharps (2013)
presented participant-jurors with a witness testimony obtained from a real criminal
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transcript. In his testimony, the witness reported observing the perpetrator of a violent
assault despite his view being obscured by a physical obstruction and dim lighting.
Researchers only manipulated details related to the level of criminal violence reported by
the witness to determine whether participants would evaluate the quality of view
differently based on the intensity of the crime. Results indicated that jurors were more
likely to rate the witness’s statement as accurate when the crime was especially violent,
even when the witnessing conditions were very poor. Furthermore, jurors in the “high
violence” condition were also less likely to describe the witness’s obscured view when
justifying their belief decision. These findings indicate that jurors do not adequately
assess witness view of the perpetrator when making decisions about the probative value
of a criminal testimony. This is particularly troublesome as viewing the culprit’s face is
imperative when making a subsequent facial identification.
Juror “Overbelief”
A possible reason for jury members’ poor discriminatory ability may involve a
disproportionately high rate of belief. For example, participant-jurors in the Wells et al.
(1979) study believed witnesses 79.8% of the time even though only 58% of witnesses
made accurate identifications. Beaudry et al. (2015)’s study provides further support;
participants in this experiment were also more likely to believe than disbelieve witnesses,
even though their ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate testimonies was
no greater than chance. This tendency to “overbelieve” occurs even when witnesses’
view of the perpetrator is very poor. In the Lindsay et al. (1981) study, participant
witnesses in the low situational accuracy condition (designed to yield 33% accurate
identifications) were believed by jurors 62% of the time. The troubling discrepancy
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between accuracy potential and juror belief suggests that having a good view of a
criminal is less important than simply making a suspect identification. It appears that as
long as a witness makes an identification, jury members are likely to believe the selected
individual is guilty.
Story Model Theory
Investigating cognitive theories that surround jury decision-making strategies may
offer insight into jurors’ high rate of witness belief. In particular, Pennington & Hastie
(1993)’s “story model theory” provides a possible explanation for juror overbelief. This
theory posits that jurors evaluate courtroom evidence by constructing a linear narrative of
events. This cognitive process involves organizing the wealth of presented evidence into
a simpler, story-like timeline. Jurors then use previously developed schemas about
human criminal behavior to classify the narrative into the best-fitting verdict category.
Although each jury member is provided with the same trial evidence, differences
in verdict choice may result from individual variability in the juror’s knowledge and
beliefs about the world. For example, a jury member may hold very specific expectations
of which characteristics best represent a “typical” criminal. These expectations, or
biases, may influence how each juror individually interprets courtroom evidence. If a
defendant appears to match these biases, this may increase the likelihood that the juror
will support a guilty verdict, even when prosecution evidence is weak. Another way in
which the story model theory may help to explain jurors’ high belief rate involves a
desire for narrative resolution.
The story model theory suggests that jurors utilize generic expectations of story
construction when choosing a verdict (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). For example, a story
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typically involves a linear series of connected events with a clear beginning, middle, and
end. If jurors impose a narrative organization on trial information, then they may also be
motivated to obtain a satisfactory resolution to the story. Perhaps a desire for story
“completeness” encourages jurors to reach a guilty verdict even when testimony evidence
is weak. Conversely, a not guilty verdict might reflect an ambiguous conclusion to the
events’ narrative since the true perpetrator’s identity is left uncertain. Therefore, the
story model theory could help to explain jurors’ overwhelming belief in eyewitness
testimony because disbelieving a witness leaves the conflict unresolved.
Misleading Identification
The previously discussed research illustrates the extent to which jury members
often overlook important factors related to suspect identification; however, the reason a
witness identifies a person in a lineup may also mislead jurors and influence their final
verdict decision. For example, when witnesses make an identification of someone they
recognize in a lineup, their selection may not be an accurate statement of that person’s
guilt; the witness may be simply naming people they know from the area in which the
crime occurred. United States law enforcement typically performs neighborhood
canvasses in areas surrounding the crime scene in order to obtain any potentially relevant
information (Boyce et al., 2007). This may involve police conducting interviews of
possible witnesses to the crime or simply corroborating information gathered from
various sources. Law enforcement may also present photographic lineups that include
individuals who have been mentioned to authorities as possible suspects in the crime;
they may ask acquaintances of the victim to make identifications from those depicted in
the lineups to determine if they have been given correct information. Essentially,

10

investigators attempt to narrow potential suspects and determine which individuals
frequent surrounding areas who may be able to provide additional information. Even so,
merely identifying someone could potentially mislead jurors into believing that the
selection provides support for a guilty verdict. Other identification factors may also
negatively influence jury decision-making.
Jury members may view witnesses operating under partial or second-hand
information about a crime as being more capable of making accurate identifications than
is reasonable. For example, studies show that witnesses with shorter exposure times to a
perpetrator are less accurate when performing lineup identifications than those with
relatively longer exposure times (Memon, Hope, & Bull, 2003; Bornstein, Deffenbacher,
Penrod, & McGorty, 2012); furthermore, poor viewing conditions also decrease recall
accuracy (Wells et al., 1979). Taking this into consideration, identifications under these
types of circumstances should not be as persuasive as those made by witnesses with a
more complete view of the perpetrator. Even so, past research has indicated that jurors
often misinterpret eyewitness information (Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Lindsay et al.,
1981). Given the insensitivity to factors that affect eyewitness accuracy, it stands to
reason that jury members may also misconstrue information included in a witness’s
testimony as providing affirmation of an identified individual’s guilt, even when the
information has little probative value. This could contribute to the high number of
wrongful convictions that result from believing incorrect eyewitnesses.
Understanding how jury members evaluate witness testimony provides critical
information to law enforcement and policy makers within the legal system. In particular,
criminal cases that require jurors to assess defendants based on witness testimony alone
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(Wogalter et al., 2004) necessitate a keen understanding of juror decision-making
processes to reduce wrongful convictions. Demonstrating how jury members measure
different types of witness information adds to the existing knowledge base of psychology
and law. Furthermore, the findings of the current study may offer additional insight into
how existing jury guidelines could be changed and improved. By manipulating various
witness testimony information - such as the witness’s quality of view, familiarity with the
perpetrator, and input from neighbors - one can refine the type of information that jury
members consider viable for choosing a guilty verdict.
Hypotheses
The goal of this research was to examine how various eyewitness-viewing
conditions and supplemental knowledge about a criminal suspect influenced jurors’
likelihood to convict. To accomplish this, jury-eligible participants were presented with
manipulated court case transcripts from a real criminal case that described the events of a
robbery and murder. Each transcript condition contained varying amounts of information
provided by an eyewitness as well as a subsequent lineup identification. At the end of the
transcript, participants were asked to give a verdict of guilty or not guilty for the
individual identified in the lineup and provide confidence ratings for their decision and
credibility ratings for the witness.
Using past research as a guide, it was first hypothesized that participants would
give the highest rate of guilty verdicts when the witness made an identification based on
seeing the perpetrator’s face (“Normal Crime” condition). Past research by Lindsay et al.
(1981) demonstrated that jurors recognized the advantages of a better quality view when
determining witness accuracy potential. In particular, they acknowledged that a full view
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of the culprit’s face, as opposed to a partial view, results in a higher potential for
identification accuracy. If participant-jurors in the current study consider these factors,
they may provide the most guilty verdicts when the witness claims to have viewed the
perpetrator’s face and then makes a subsequent lineup identification based solely on this
information. In addition to this, it was also predicted that jurors would give the highest
confidence ratings for their verdict decision in the “Normal Crime” condition and would
rate the witness as being the most credible.
Second, it was hypothesized that participants would give a medium rate of guilty
verdicts when the witness made an identification based only on viewing the perpetrator’s
clothing during the crime (“Inferential” condition”). According to Lindsay et al. (1981),
jurors appropriately reduced their rate of belief between witnessing condition as the
potential for identification accuracy decreased. Without an adequate view of the face, a
witness who infers the identity of the culprit based on body type and clothing should not
generate as many guilty verdicts as a witness with a more complete view of the
perpetrator. Even so, jurors may still find partial information as being more probative
than no information. Therefore, it was also predicted that jurors would give a medium
rating of confidence for their verdict decision in the “Inferential” condition.
Next, it was hypothesized that participants would also give a medium rate of
guilty verdicts when the witness did not see anything identifying about the perpetrator,
but made an identification based on neighbor input (“Hearsay” condition). If the witness
did not see clearly see the perpetrator, then participant-jurors may not convict as readily
as when the witness views the culprit’s face. Nevertheless, if the witness identified
someone based on second-hand information gathered from other potential witnesses,
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jurors may interpret the identification as being probative. Jurors might view the
combination of neighbors’ information as reliable as a first-hand account of events. It
was also predicted that jurors would give a medium rating of confidence for their verdict
decision in the “Hearsay” condition.
Finally, it was hypothesized that participants would give the lowest rate of guilty
verdicts when the witness did not see anything identifying about the perpetrator and made
a lineup identification based only on recognizing an individual from the neighborhood
(“Didn’t See” condition). This is similar to what would be experienced during a
neighborhood canvassing operation by law enforcement. In these circumstances, the
intent is simply to collect additional information. Participant-jurors may therefore give
the lowest rate of guilty verdicts as no probative information was given. Because of the
lack of information, it was also predicted that jurors would give the lowest verdict
confidence and witness credibility ratings in the “Didn’t See” condition.

14

CHAPTER II

METHOD

To test the study’s hypotheses regarding verdicts, confidence, and witness
credibility, participants were instructed to read a manipulated court case transcript of a
criminal witness’s testimony. There were four witnessing conditions in which testimony
details were manipulated. Participants provided a verdict for the suspect, confidence
ratings for their decision, and credibility ratings for the witness. Responses were
recorded using a web-based program called Qualtrics.
Participants
Participants (N = 147) were undergraduate students obtained from introductory
psychology courses at The University of Alabama in Huntsville. A G*Power 3.1.9
software analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that a sample size
larger than 141 would provide a power of .95 and a medium effect size of .35. Two
participants were eliminated from final analyses for failing more than one manipulation
check, leaving the definitive sample at 145 participants. Most participants were females
(55.2%) between the ages of 18 and 21 (84.9%) and identified as Caucasian/White
(70.3%). Refer to Table 1 (p. 28) for a summary of descriptive statistics.
Each student received one activity point towards completion of course
requirements in exchange for their participation in this experiment. Participants also
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provided informed consent before beginning the study and were debriefed at its
conclusion. Parental consent was not required as all participants were confirmed to be at
least 18 years of age at the time of their involvement. The study adhered to all APA
ethical guidelines. It was approved by the Institutional Review Board at The University
of Alabama in Huntsville (see approval letter in Appendix A and consent form in
Appendix B).
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Participants
____________________________________________________________________
Frequency
Percentage
____________________________________________________________________
Sex and Age
____________________________________________________________________
Male
65
44.8%
Female
80
55.2%
Mean Age
19
32.4%
____________________________________________________________________
Race
____________________________________________________________________
Caucasian/White
102
73.3%
African American
22
15.2%
Asian
10
6.9%
Hispanic
6
4.1%
American Indian
1
0.7%
Hawaiian/Pac. Island
1
0.7%
Other
3
2.1%
____________________________________________________________________
Highest Degree Earned
____________________________________________________________________
High school/GED
47
32.4%
Some college
94
64.8%
Bachelors degree
1
0.7%
Other
3
2.1%
____________________________________________________________________
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Design
To evaluate verdicts, the study utilized a one-way between-participants design.
There were four witnessing conditions (“Normal Crime”, “Inferential”, “Hearsay”, and
“Didn’t See”). The dependent variable was the participants’ verdict for the individual
identified in the lineup (Guilty or Not Guilty). To evaluate verdict confidence and
witness credibility, a 2 X 4 (Verdict by Condition) between-participants design was
implemented. The dependent variables were the participants’ average confidence and
credibility ratings (on a scale of 0 – 100) for each condition.
Materials
Participants performed the experiment in a private lab on desktop computers and
were randomly assigned to a condition using a number generator. A web-based program
called Qualtrics was used to organize and present the study’s stimuli. A consent form
was presented on the first page of the program to allow participants to read about the
experiment and provide voluntary informed consent (see Appendix B). Stimuli were
created using excerpts from a real court case transcript. The case depicted the events of a
robbery and murder and included a witness testimony and photographic lineup.
The first page of the case contained a “Probable Cause” document that illustrated
the details of the crime as they were reported to the police department (see Appendix C).
The document contained a police department heading complete with a police seal and
contact information to enhance realism. The Probable Cause included the date and time
that the police department received telephone calls indicating that gunshots had been
heard in the neighborhood along with a description of the type of vehicle seen. The
document also contained information about the victim of the crime, including the results
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of an autopsy and a ruling of homicide due to a gunshot wound to the head. In the final
paragraph, the document stated that police interviewed family members in the
surrounding area to determine possible leads; based on this information, the detectives
decided to interview a possible witness to the crime.
The next page contained supplementary information entered by a case coordinator
(see Appendix D). This document indicated that investigators made contact with the
possible witness to the crime and provided him with transportation to the Homicide
Office for the purpose of conducting an interview. The document explained that the
investigators had compiled a photo spread of potential suspects and that they wanted the
witness to view the photos to see who he could identify, “including those he knew only
from seeing around the neighborhood.” This was important because it provided
participants with the possibility that an identification did not necessarily mean an
admittance of guilt. Finally, the investigators stated that the purpose of the interview was
to determine whether they had been given reliable information from their sources.
The third page contained a witness interview transcript (see Appendices E-H)
followed by a photo spread with an image circled and signed with the witness’s initials
(see Appendix I). The transcript included a description of the crime by the witness as
well as a confirmation that the witness recognized someone from the lineup. Depending
on the condition assignment, participants randomly received one of four manipulations.
The manipulations took place in the witness’s description of events and his response to
the question “Did you recognize anyone in Photospread C?”. All conditions had mention
of the perpetrator wearing “new Jordan’s shoes.” The following paragraphs describe
each condition in further detail.
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In the “Normal Crime” condition, the witness stated that he could clearly see the
perpetrator’s face under adequate lighting conditions, but that he did not know the
perpetrator from a previous encounter. When asked if he recognized anyone from the
photospread, the witness confirmed that that the person he had circled was the perpetrator
of the crime (see Appendix E). The purpose of this condition was to create a baseline for
how the other conditions compared to an actual, confirmed eyewitness identification.
In the “Inferential” condition, the witness stated that he could clearly see the body
and clothing of the perpetrator under adequate lighting conditions. The witness declared
that he only knew of one person on that street that owned the same brand of shoe worn by
the perpetrator. Using this information, the witness determined that the perpetrator must
have been “Woo.” When asked if he recognized anyone from the photospread, the
witness stated that the person he had circled was “Woo” (see Appendix F).
In the “Hearsay” condition, the witness stated that he only saw the legs of the
perpetrator and that it was too dark to see the culprit. The witness indicated that he had
talked to some people in the neighborhood after the event and that they all believed that
the person who committed the crime was “Woo”. When asked if he recognized anyone
from the photospread, the witness confirmed that the person he had circled was “Woo”
(see Appendix G).
Finally, in the “Didn’t See” condition, the witness stated that it was too dark to
see anything at all. The witness indicated that he had talked to some people in the
neighborhood after the event and they all believed that the person who committed the
crime was wearing “new Jordan’s shoes”. When asked if he recognized anyone from the
photospread, the witness stated that the person he had circled was “Woo.” The purpose
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of this condition was to determine how participants would respond to nonprobative
information from a witness who did not see any details of the crime, but simply made an
identification based on viewing someone he recognized (see Appendix H).
The following pages included areas to provide verdict choice and sentencing
recommendation, verdict confidence, and witness credibility rating. Verdict choice was
recorded as either marking “Guilty” or “Not Guilty” on the computer screen. If the
participant gave a guilty verdict, they were informed that the average sentencing time for
this type of crime was between 15 and 60 years in prison. This information was obtained
from a state law database (Statelaws.findlaw.com, 2016). Participants entered their
recommended sentencing time (in years) in the space provided. Verdict confidence was
provided on a sliding scale ranging from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (completely
confident). This rating denoted the participants’ degree of confidence in their guilty or
not guilty verdict choice. Witness credibility was recorded on a separate sliding scale
ranging from 0 (not at all credible) to 100 (completely credible). This represented the
participants’ judgment of the witness’s credibility.
The concluding pages contained a series of manipulation check questions, a
demographic questionnaire, and a debriefing statement. The manipulation check section
included five questions that referenced content contained on each page of the court case
transcript; participants selected responses from a series of multiple-choice answers (see
Appendix I). The demographic questionnaire recorded general information about the
participants’ sex, age, race, and education. Finally, the debriefing statement contained an
explanation of the experiment and provided contact information to the study’s researchers
as well as the campus counseling center (see Appendix J).
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Procedure
This study was conducted in a private lab at The University of Alabama in
Huntsville. Students signed up to participate in the experiment through an online
program called SONA. The experiment began with the participants indicating that they
were at least 18 years of age. Students gave voluntary informed consent and provided
proof of their age at the time of their session. Researchers maintained participant
anonymity by avoiding the collection of personally identifying information and using
experiment numbers in place of names on all forms related to the experiment.
Furthermore, investigators achieved data confidentiality by only permitting use of the
dataset for statistical analysis, not to examine specific individuals.
Participants were first seated at one of three desktop computer terminals where
they were randomly assigned to a condition number by a research assistant. Participants
were asked to read the voluntary informed consent form and instructions on the computer
screen before giving assent. Next, participants read the court case transcript and provided
a verdict for the individual identified in the photographic lineup. They were then
instructed to give their verdict confidence and witness credibility ratings on a scale of 0
to 100. If a not guilty verdict was selected, the participant continued onto the next
section. If a guilty verdict was chosen, participants were asked to provide a
recommended sentencing time for the suspect before continuing.
Once this section of the experiment was complete, participants responded to a
series of five manipulation checks to determine the degree of attention given to the
experiment. Participants then completed the demographics questionnaire and provided
their sex, age, race, and education level. The experiment ended with participants reading
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a debriefing script that contained contact information for the researchers and the campus
counseling center. Additionally, participants were asked not to discuss the experiment
with anyone else to protect the integrity of the data. The experiment lasted no longer
than 30 minutes to complete and participants received one research credit in exchange for
their participation. They were given the opportunity to ask questions before being
released from the study.
Statistics
The current study examined whether varying the type of probative information
presented in an eyewitness’s testimony influenced mock jurors’ verdicts. To assess this,
a between-participants one-way design with four conditions was utilized (“Normal
Crime”, “Inferential”, “Hearsay”, and “Didn’t See”) and verdict decision (“Guilty” or
“Not Guilty”) as the dependent variable. First, a Chi Square Test for Independence was
performed to compare all four conditions. Next, five separate pairwise comparisons were
conducted to reveal which of the conditions were significantly different from the others.
To reduce the chance of a Type I error, a more conservative significance level of .01 was
adopted for all follow up tests. Finally, multiple odds ratios were executed for each
condition to determine the likelihood that an individual would give a guilty verdict
depending on condition assignment.
Participants’ verdict confidence and assessment of witness credibility were also
evaluated for each condition. To test this, a 2 X 4 (Verdict by Condition) betweensubjects univariate ANOVA was performed for both confidence and credibility. Verdict
was divided into two levels (“Guilty” and “Not Guilty”). Condition was divided into four
levels (“Normal Crime”, “Inferential”, “Hearsay”, and “Didn’t See”). Confidence and
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credibility ratings were averaged across all conditions for both guilty and not guilty
verdicts.
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CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Verdicts
Across all conditions, 46% of participant-jurors gave guilty verdicts. As
predicted, there were overall significant differences in the proportion of guilty verdicts
between conditions, Χ2(3, N = 145) = 14.382, p = .002, Cramer’s V = .315, indicating a
medium effect size. Pairwise planned comparisons revealed that participants in the
“Didn’t See” condition gave significantly fewer guilty verdicts (25%) compared to the
“Inferential” condition (63.9%), Χ2(1, N = 71) = 14.010, p < .001 Cramer’s V = .444. This
shows that, as expected, jurors appropriately reduced their rate of belief when the witness
offered no probative information in his testimony. Surprisingly, this was the only
comparison in which significant differences were observed at the traditional level.
Percentage of guilty verdicts in the “Didn’t See” condition (25%) did not differ
significantly when compared to the “Normal Crime” condition (48.6%), Χ2(1, N = 70) =
6.341, p = .012, Cramer’s V = .301, and the “Hearsay” condition (48.7%), Χ2(1, N = 74) =
6.675, p = .010, Cramer’s V = .300. This suggests that participants did not sufficiently
consider the various witnessing factors involved in making an accurate facial
identification of a criminal perpetrator. These results are depicted in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Proportion of guilty verdicts as a function of witnessing condition.

In addition to the chi square test, odds ratios for each pairwise comparison were
also conducted. According to Howell (2013), calculating odds ratios may actually
provide more useful information than demonstrating statistical significance alone. The
odds ratios were calculated to determine the probability that an individual will provide a
guilty verdict in any one condition compared to another.
Comparing the “Normal Crime” condition to the “Didn’t See” condition revealed
that the odds of voting guilty were 3.7776 times greater when the witness reported seeing
the culprit’s face than when the witness did not see the culprit at all. This appears to
illustrate that jurors value a full view of the perpetrator’s face when assessing witness
accuracy; however, additional comparisons demonstrated some surprising findings. The
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odds of voting guilty were 3.8 times greater when the witness made an identification
based on neighbor input (“Hearsay” condition) than when the witness did not see the
culprit. This suggests that jurors may equate the probative value of a facial view with
neighbor feedback. Comparing the “Inferential” condition to the “Didn’t See” condition
revealed that the odds of voting guilty were 7.0768 times greater when the witness made
an identification based on viewing the perpetrator’s clothing than when the witness did
not see the culprit at all. This indicates that that jurors may view a witness’s familiarity
with an article of clothing as more probative than a facial view of a stranger.
Confidence
Overall, participants were 61.1% confident that they made the correct verdict
decision. The analysis revealed only a significant main effect for condition,
F(1, 145) = 4.936, p = .003, ηp2 = .098. Differences in mock jurors’ confidence by
condition were evaluated using Scheffe’s test. Participants were significantly more
confident in the “Inferential” condition (M = 68.8%, p = .003) and the “Didn’t See”
condition (M = 64.7%, p = .04) compared to the “Hearsay” condition (51.3%). To further
examine these results, follow-up univariate ANOVAs were performed separately for
guilty and not guilty-voters.
For guilty-voters, the main effect for condition was not significant,
F(1, 66) = 1.049, p = .377; however, for not guilty-voters, the main effect for condition
was significant, F(1, 79) = 7.585, p < .001, ηp2 = .233. A post-hoc Scheffe’s test was
utilized for not guilty-voters to determine which of the conditions differed significantly.
Results indicated that participants who voted not guilty in the “Inferential” condition had
a higher average confidence rating (70.2%) compared to the “Hearsay” condition
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(45.1%), and this difference was significant, p = .003. Furthermore, participants who
voted not guilty in the “Didn’t See” condition had a higher average confidence rating
(66.4%) compared to the “Hearsay” condition, and this difference was significant,
p = .002. These results indicate that participant-jurors felt more confident giving a not
guilty verdict when the witness did not see the perpetrator’s face. Figure 1.2 illustrates
these findings.
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Figure 1.2: Mean confidence rating as a function of verdict choice and condition (error
bars represent standard errors).
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Credibility
Across all conditions, participants rated the witness as being 54.3% credible.
There was a significant main effect for verdict, F(1, 145) = 17.252, p < .001, ηp2 = .112.
Participants rated the witness as being more credible when they voted guilty (63.6%)
compared to when they voted not guilty (46.6%). Next, the main effect for condition was
not significant, F(1, 145) = .702, p = .552. Participants did not rate the witness as being
more credible in one condition over another. Finally, there was not a significant
interaction between verdict and condition, F(1, 145) = .683, p = .683. Figure 1.3 depicts
these results.
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Figure 1.3: Mean credibility rating as a function of verdict choice and condition (error
bars represent standard errors).
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CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

An unacceptably high number of wrongful convictions result directly from
eyewitness misidentification; this alarming injustice necessitates a greater understanding
of the jury decision-making process to aid in protecting the innocent. Previous research
has demonstrated that potential jury members often experience difficulty when
differentiating accurate from inaccurate witnesses (Beaudry et al., 2015; Boyce et al.,
2007; Lindsay et al., 1981; Wells et al., 1979; Wells et al., 1980). This may result in part
from jurors misinterpreting how various situational factors can negatively influence
identification accuracy (Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Lindsay et al., 1981). A tendency for
jury members to “overbelieve” in the identification ability of witnesses illustrates the
need to examine the type and amount of information jurors use to make verdict decisions.
Taking these concerns into consideration, the goal of this study was to investigate how
various eyewitness-viewing conditions and supplemental knowledge about a criminal
suspect influenced jurors’ conviction rates, verdict confidence, and judgments of witness
credibility.
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Verdicts
The current findings indicated that participant-jurors did not sufficiently consider
the various factors that could impact an eyewitness’s identification accuracy. When
investigating verdict choice, the only conditions to differ significantly in percentage of
guilty verdicts were the “Didn’t See” condition compared to the “Inferential” condition.
Jurors gave fewer guilty verdicts when the witness reported not seeing anything
identifying about the perpetrator compared to when the witness made an identification
based on recognizing the culprit’s distinctive footwear. This suggests that jurors
generally equated the probative value of an identification based on a facial view with an
identification based on a partial or absent view of the culprit. To the experimenter’s
knowledge, no other study has demonstrated a propensity to convict so pervasive that a
witness was not actually required to view the perpetrator at all in order to elicit a
conviction. Alarmingly, it appears that the very act of identifying someone from a lineup
undermined the strength of the circumstances precipitating the identification.
The higher rate of guilty verdicts in the “Inferential” condition compared to the
“Didn’t See” condition may offer valuable insight into jurors’ decision-making rationale.
The witness in the “Inferential” condition admitted that he did not see the assailant’s face,
but believed he recognized the culprit’s brand of shoe. Participant-jurors may have
placed greater value in this witness’s identification because they regarded clothing
recognition as a form of supporting physical evidence. Research illustrates how jurors
often equate the probative value of witness testimony with that of forensic evidence
(Skolnick & Shaw, 2001). Taking this into consideration, it stands to reason that a
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combination of the two factors would further increase jurors’ likelihood to believe the
witness.
Another factor that could have influenced jurors’ conviction rates in the
“Inferential” condition involves the witness’s proposed familiarity with the perpetrator.
Research suggests that witnesses often make associations between criminal perpetrators
and someone well known to them (Lucas & Brewer, 2015). Participant-jurors may have
deduced that the witness’s recognition of the culprit’s shoes increased his likelihood of
making an accurate identification, despite the witness never acquiring a confirming facial
view. This is concerning as an identification based on clothing is not indicative of
accuracy (Yarmey, 2004). Moreover, clothing may be easily changed, shared, or altered
and is not generally unique to just one individual; multiple people could own the same
brand of shoes. If participant-jurors based their verdict decision on clothing familiarity,
this could have troubling implications for real-world suspects with physical
characteristics or attire similar to that of the culprit.
Confidence
Regarding jurors’ verdict confidence, guilty-voters were no more confident in one
condition over another. In contrast, not guilty-voters rated themselves as more confident
in the “Inferential” and “Didn’t See” conditions compared to “Hearsay” condition. This
suggests that jurors who gave a guilty verdict may not have sufficiently attended to the
various barriers to accuracy experienced by the witness in each condition. Furthermore,
guilty-voters may have failed to consider alternative scenarios in which the witness could
have been mistaken. Jurors who voted not guilty likely provided higher confidence
ratings in the “Inferential” and “Didn’t See” conditions because they recognized that the
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witness’s lack of view reflected a lower potential for identification accuracy. This is in
opposition to the findings of Lindsay et al. (1981)’s study, in which participants’ verdict
confidence did not decline based on situational accuracy.
The “Hearsay” condition may have generated lower verdict confidence because
not guilty-voters possibly viewed input from neighbors as cases of corroborating witness
accounts. Although the witness in this condition did not achieve an identifying view of
the culprit, he made a second-hand identification based on information obtained by a
third party. Jurors potentially equated the reliability of the two identifications. Research
provides support for this idea; Golding, Sanchez, and Sego (1997) incorporated a
“hearsay” witness into their study to demonstrate that an individual testifying on behalf
of another person generated the same perception of defendant guilt as a first-hand
account from the victim. Not-guilty voters in the “Hearsay” condition may have
experienced a decrease in confidence because they were influenced by the possibility of
the neighbors acting as corroborating witnesses. This may also explain why the overall
proportion of guilty verdicts did not significantly differ in the “Hearsay” condition.
Credibility
As expected, jurors who voted guilty rated the witness as appearing more credible
than jurors who voted not guilty. This indicated that jury members utilized their own
evaluations of witness credibility when making final verdict decisions. Condition
assignment, however, did not influence judgments of witness credibility. Jurors viewed
the witness as just as credible when he reported seeing the culprit’s face as when he did
not see anything identifying about the perpetrator. In absence of specific instructions for
evaluating believability, it appeared that jurors did not consider culprit view an important
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factor when judging witness credibility. This provides additional support for research
demonstrating how jurors often overlook obstructions to witness accuracy, such as poor
lighting and limited exposure time, when assessing witness testimony (Lindsay et al.,
1986; Sharps et al., 2013).
Implications
The current study investigated how various eyewitness-viewing conditions and
supplemental information about a crime influenced participant-jurors’ verdicts,
confidence, and judgments of witness credibility. Contrary to the hypotheses, jury
members seemed largely unaffected by variations in the quality of the witness’s view. It
appears that many jurors considered a witness’s testimony and lineup selection as
important factors in determining defendant guilt, regardless of testimony strength.
Providing support for the story model theory (Pennington & Hastie, 1993), this suggests
that when the events surrounding a crime are vague, jurors may use criminal schemas to
make inferences about the content of the missing details. Furthermore, the lack of
difference in jurors’ credibility ratings across witnessing conditions might indicate that
the quality of the witness’s view was not a determining factor of credibility. Perhaps
jurors search for indications of purposeful deception when evaluating witness credibility,
rather than attending to more concrete factors, such as opportunity to view. Overall, it
seems that jurors’ verdicts depend on a variety of implicit factors not entirely related to
the physical conditions of the crime.
The results of this research will add to the current psychology and law knowledge
base by clarifying the ways in which jurors assess particular aspects of witness testimony.
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The study also provided support for Pennington and Hastie (1993)’s story model theory
by evaluating how potential jury members construct narratives using weak eyewitness
testimony evidence. In particular, the findings indicate that jurors may use criminal
schemas or personal biases when making inferences about the details missing from a
witness’s testimony. Most importantly, the results of this study offer a standard of
comparison for investigating the impact of other courtroom procedures, such as the
influence of attorney statements.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study contains several limitations that one should consider when
evaluating its findings. First, the research utilized a convenience sampling of college
students from the University of Alabama in Huntsville. The majority of these students
were women between the ages of 18 and 21 who identified as White. As with all
research, care should be taken when generalizing the results of this study to other regions
and age groups. Even so, past jury decision-making research reveals few differences in
outcome measures when community members are compared to college students
(Bornstein et al., 2016). The results of this study are likely reflective of other
populations.
Next, the study is somewhat limited in regards to external validity. Although the
stimuli were extracted from a real court case transcript, the experiment provides only a
simple simulation of the complex jury decision-making process. In real-world situations,
many other factors influence jurors’ verdicts. For example, presenting a live witness
testimony rather than a typed transcript could alter the way in which the jury perceives
the witness. Fortunately, a meta-analysis provides support for the legitimacy of jury
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simulation research and its real-world applications (Bornstein et al., 2016). Furthermore,
the current study follows a solid jury decision-making paradigm that has been used
successfully in past research.
An interesting follow-up to this study would be to examine the impact of attorney
statements on jurors’ verdicts, confidence, and judgments of witness credibility. Even
though past research has indicated that expert testimony does not sway jury’s verdicts
(Martire & Kemp, 2011; Wells et al., 1980), statements from attorneys may influence
jurors to a greater degree. According to Pennington and Hastie (1993), attorney
statements offer a pivotal opportunity to restructure courtroom evidence in a narrative
manner and provide suggestions to jurors about possible motivations for the suspect’s
actions. The influence of such procedures could be investigated by replicating the current
study and incorporating opening and closing statements from both the prosecution and
defense. The results would provide valuable insight into how attorney statements impact
jurors’ verdicts.
Investigating juror bias may also help to explain the high conviction rate in this
study. Past jury decision-making research proposes that measuring attitudes towards
authority figures may function as a useful tool in evaluating juror verdicts (Sealy, 1981;
Werner, Kagehiro, & Strube; 1982). In particular, a study by Werner et al. revealed that
individuals ranking high in authoritarian attitudes demonstrated an increased likelihood to
convict criminal defendants compared to low authoritarian individuals. Furthermore,
authoritarian jurors attended to incriminating evidence in a mock trial more often than
nonauthoritarians, even when that evidence was considered inadmissible by the court.
Another study by Sealy revealed that jurors with more favorable views of the jury system
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were the most likely group to convict a defendant and then later uphold their verdict
decision after deliberation with other jury members. These findings illustrate how jurors’
beliefs about the legal system influence final verdict choice.
Perhaps jury members with preconceived conviction biases exhibit selective
attention to courtroom evidence that supports their belief system. This may result in
biased jurors ignoring potentially exonerating information. For example, jurors with a
bias towards conviction may be less influenced by the possibility of alternative scenarios
in which the suspect may be innocent of the crime. Furthermore, they may be less
dissuaded by a lack of supporting physical evidence when choosing a guilty verdict. In
follow-up research, including a scale to measure participant-juror bias, such as Kravitz,
Cutler, and Brock (1993)’s Revised Legal Attitudes scale, may offer valuable information
about the impact of juror bias on verdict decision. The results could demonstrate whether
a conviction bias motivated the jurors in the current study to vote guilty based on
testimony alone. Moreover, it may provide a possible explanation as to why the jurors
failed to adjust their guilty verdict rate and confidence appropriately between witnessing
conditions. Overall, these additions would allow for a more comprehensive
understanding of the numerous influential factors that may guide the jury decisionmaking process.
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APPENDIX A

January 14, 2016
Ms. Brandi Cook
Graduate Student
Psychology Department
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Dear Ms. Cook,
The UAH Institutional Review Board of Human Subjects Committee has
reviewed your proposal, Impact of misleading identification on juror decision-making,
and found it meets the necessary criteria for continued approval. Your proposal seems to
be in compliance with this institutions Federal Wide Assurance (FWA) 00019998 and the
DHHS Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46).
Please note that this approval is good for one year from the date on this letter. If
data collection continues past this period, you are responsible for processing a renewal
application a minimum of 60 days prior to the expiration date.
No changes are to be made to the approved protocol without prior review and
approval from the UAH IRB. All changes (e.g. a change in procedure, number of
subjects, personnel, study locations, new recruitment materials, study instruments, etc)
must be prospectively reviewed and approved by the IRB before they are implemented.
You should report any unanticipated problems involving risks to the participants or others
to the IRB Chair.
If you have any questions regarding the IRB’s decision, please contact me.
Sincerely,

William Wilkerson
IRB Chair
Dean, Honors College
38

APPENDIX B
Consent Form: Criminal Witness Identification
You are invited to participate in a research study about criminal witnesses. This study is
designed to help us to better understand how people make decisions in criminal cases.
The study is being supervised by Dr. Jeffrey Neuschatz and the primary investigator is
Brandi Cook from the University of Alabama in Huntsville. A total of 120 volunteers will
be recruited for this study. You may contact the investigator by email if you have any
questions at bac0002@uah.edu or neuschaj@uah.edu. Please be advised that this
experiment is only open for those who are 18 years of age or older. Please be prepared to
present a form of ID that confirms your age at the time of your session.
PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE STUDY: Once written consent is given,
you will be asked to individually read a transcript from a real court case on a computer
screen and answer some questions. This session will take 30 minutes and you will receive
one research credit for your participation in the experiment.
DISCOMFORTS AND RISKS FROM PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY: There are
no expected risks associated with your participation. The crime transcript will be similar
to what you have read in popular media. If you are photosensitive, you are advised to
seek an alternate study.
EXPECTED BENEFITS: Through participating in this study, you will have the
opportunity to gain knowledge about the experimental research process. Additionally,
your participation will contribute to scientific literature as a whole and allow the
community to learn and benefit from the research’s findings.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RESULTS: Participant numbers will be used to record your
data, and these numbers will be made available only to those researchers directly
involved with this study, thereby ensuring strict confidentiality. This consent form will
be destroyed within 3 years. The data from your session will only be released to those
individuals who are directly involved in the research and only using your participant
number.
FREEDOM TO WITHDRAW: You are free to withdraw from the study at any time.
You will not be penalized because of withdrawal in any form. Investigators reserve the
right to remove any participant from the session without regard to the participant’s
consent.
CONTACT INFORMATION: If any questions should arise about this study or your
rights as a participant, you may contact the Principal Investigator at any point in the
research process. You may contact Brandi Cook in Morton Hall 101D at
bac0002@uah.edu. You may also contact the faculty supervisor Dr. Jeffrey Neuschatz at
neuschaj@uah.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or
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concerns or complaints about the research, you may contact the Office of the IRB (IRB)
at 256-824-6101 or email Dr. William Wilkerson at irb@uah.edu.
If you agree to participate in our research on a strictly voluntary basis, please sign and
date below. One copy of this consent form is for your records.
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at UAH.
________________________________ ___________________________________
Name (Please Print) Signature
Date
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APPENDIX J
Thank you for participating in our study. The primary purpose of this study is to
determine how jury members make decisions using information given by a potential
eyewitness of a crime. The responses that you have made during this survey will be used
to help us better understand different factors that may affect jury members.
We ask that you please do not discuss this study with other individuals. When
participants come into a study with knowledge of the task, it often makes the results
unusable for the researchers. Thank you for your cooperation.
If your participation in this study has upset you in any way, please feel free to set up an
appointment with UAHuntsville Counseling and Testing Services, located at Wilson Hall
329. They can also be reached at (256) 824-6203.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact the researchers at
UAHuntsville: Brandi Cook at bac0002@uah.edu or Dr. Jeffrey Neuschatz at
neuschaj@uah.edu.
Thank you for your help today.
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